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PAY TO PLAY? THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONDITIONAL
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I.

INTRODUCTION

High school athletic programs offer students a valuable extracurricular
education that would otherwise be unavailable as a part of the required
curriculum. Of the approximate fifteen million high school students in the
United States,1 over half participate on an athletic team of some kind.2
Unfortunately, injuries are an innate characteristic of athletics. Injury
statistics from the most popular high school sports teams3 show that each
year, approximately two million injuries are sustained.4 Out of those two
million injured, 500,000 seek medical attention5 and 30,000 are
hospitalized.6 Yet, participation is at an all-time high.7 As society continues
to evolve and recreational entertainers continue to require exculpatory
contracts, voluntary participants seemingly have become increasingly less
*

J.D., 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1
Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id
=372 (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
2
Probability
of
Competing
Beyond
High
School,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school
(last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
3
John W. Powell & Kim D. Barber-Foss, Injury Patterns in Selected High School
Sports: A Review of the 1995–1997 Seasons, 34 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 277 (1999)
(showcasing injury statistics from the top ten high school sports: football, wrestling, baseball,
field hockey, softball, girls’ volleyball, boys’ and girls’ basketball, and boys’ and girls’
soccer).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
See also Sports Injury Statistics, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/healthlibrary/conditions/pediatrics/sports_injury_statistics
_90,P02787 (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (illustrating the statistics of adolescent sports injuries
that result in emergency room visits, traumatic brain injuries, and death).
7
Compare NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 2016–17
(2017), http://nfhs.org/media/1017531/2016-17-nfhs-handbook.pdf, with NAT’L FED’N OF
STATE
HIGH
SCH.
ASS’N,
NFHS
HANDBOOK
1969–2014
(2014),
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatics/PDF/Participation%20Survey%20History%20Boo
k.pdf, and NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 2014–15 (2015),
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatics/PDF/2014-15_Participation_Survey_Results.pdf,
and NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, NFHS HANDBOOK 2015–16 (2016),
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF/2015-16_Sports_Participation_Survey.pdf.
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hesitant about waiving liability.8 As a result, individuals are beginning to
question whether these conditional waivers have any legal significance or if
they are just a mere formality implemented to deter the injured from pursuing
legal action.9
In today’s increasingly litigious culture, it is essential that student
athletes sign liability waivers or pre-injury releases as a condition of
participation.10 Schools require exculpation in order to shift the risk from
themselves to the participants who, by entering into such contracts, expressly
agree to assume the risk of injury.11 In so conditioning participation upon
this contractual relationship, these agreements reduce the risks, and therefore
the costs, of extracurricular activities12 and are more cost-effective than
insuring against the likelihood of such claims.13 In the context of
extracurricular athletics, exculpatory contracts are also important to the
students. Assent from the participant provides evidence of a conscious
decision to voluntarily join in the sport, to accept the foreseeable
consequences of that particular activity, and to forego future claims or causes
of action that may arise in the event of injury.14
Of course, exculpatory contracts cannot protect against all potential
claims.15 Furthermore, unless the contract is conspicuously drafted so that a
8
See generally Joshua D. Arters & Ben M. Rose, Kindly Remove my Child from the
Bubble Wrap—Analyzing Childress v. Madison County and Why Tennessee Courts Should
Enforce Parental Pre-Injury Liability Waivers, 11 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 8, 9 (2016).
9
Id.
10
For the purposes of this Comment, liability waivers, hold harmless clauses, and similar
exculpatory releases are referred to as exculpatory contracts.
11
BRUCE B. HRONEK & JOHN O. SPENGLER, LEGAL LIABILITY IN RECREATION AND
SPORTS 77 (Sagamore 2d ed. 2002).
12
Arters & Rose, supra note 8, at 55–56.
13
Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 363 (Fla. 2008) (Wells, J., dissenting) (observing that
insuring against the probability of injuries sustained while participating in public school
events is not a realistic alternative because the high costs of doing so “deplete already very
scarce resources”).
14
See generally Authorization & Waiver by Parent(s) or Legal Guardian(s) of Minor
Child, 16 COMPLETE L. 35 (1999) (showcasing an example of a boilerplate exculpatory
contract). Even though student athletes are the ones who are directly affected, schools within
the United States generally require the parent(s) or guardians(s) of minor students to waive
such liability over their child’s claims. See, e.g., Doe v. Banos, 966 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479
(D.N.J. 2013) (reaffirming the constitutionality of the Haddonfield Board of Education’s
school policy requiring parents to consent to a “24/7 [p]olicy” as a prerequisite to their
children’s participation in extracurricular activities and school sponsored sports teams). The
validity of parental waivers in the context of extracurricular athletics will not be addressed in
this Comment.
15
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 409 F. 3d. 73, 83–87
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that protection from reckless, grossly negligent, or intentional conduct
that results in injury is against public policy); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo.
1981) (en banc) (holding that exculpatory contracts which attempt to insulate a party from
liability, “in no event will . . . shield against a claim for willful and wanton negligence”).
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reasonable person is able to appreciate its terms, the agreement is deemed
unenforceable.16 Likewise, courts justify the invalidation of conditional
exculpatory contracts as offending public policy only where its enforcement
would adversely impact the fundamental concerns to the whole of society.17
Conditional exculpatory contracts for student athletes are unique, and
differing views of public policy have created a rift in their enforceability
across the country. One understanding is that a student’s choice to
participate in an extracurricular activity is a voluntary decision in a nonessential activity, and therefore, any conditional exculpatory agreement that
may be required as a prerequisite for participation is otherwise enforceable.18
The other understanding is that extracurricular activities are
indistinguishable from the rest of the curriculum, i.e., since the field is an
extension of the classroom, such conditional exculpatory contracts are void
and unenforceable.19 Under this latter view, because there is no difference
between curricular classes and extracurricular activities, invalidation is
warranted because a student’s voluntary participation in an extracurricular
activity is thought to be just as important to that student’s education as well
as the school’s overall educational scheme as is the curriculum.20 As a result
of this divide, a student athlete in one jurisdiction would have a claim that a
similarly situated student athlete in another jurisdiction would not.
This Comment examines whether public policy may invalidate
conditional exculpatory contracts between schools and student athletes. Part
II of this Comment summarizes the public policy considerations argued by
litigants and adopted by certain courts to invalidate mandatory exculpatory
contracts. This Part describes the idea of extending the public interest
beyond the bounds of the traditional curriculum and argues that a traditional
education and the option to participate in extracurricular athletics is not so
intertwined as to justify a concern to the whole of society, therefore
triggering the public interest. Part III of this Comment reviews various
methods courts use to determine the existence of the public interest and its
impact in the extracurricular context. Because it is unclear what tests courts
should apply, this Part discusses and analyzes the two most popular
approaches. Part IV of this Comment discusses these two methods through
an examination of the analyses adopted by Washington in Wagenblast v.
Odessa School District,21 by California in Hohe v. San Diego Unified School

16
17
18
19
20
21

See Anderson v. Regis Corp., 185 Fed. App’x 768 (10th Cir. 2006).
Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988).
See Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Mass. 2002).
See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d 968 at 970.
Id. at 972.
Id.
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District,22 and by Massachusetts in Sharon v. City of Newton.23 Part V
ultimately rejects Washington’s approach and urges for the adoption of the
hybrid approach applied in Massachusetts. Finally, Part VI concludes that
the public interest does not extend to instances when schools condition
exculpation of liability for student participation in extracurricular athletics,
and doing so does not conflict with public policy and should be a permissible
means for schools to protect themselves against liability.
II. FOR THE GREATER GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY
A. Public Policy as Gatekeeper to the Public Interest in Athletics
Although the idea of public policy is open-ended, that term is widely
understood as being synonymous with the public good.24 Traditionally, the
forces behind the invocation of the “policy of the law” to invalidate a
contract were aimed at agreements that tended to promote litigation or
restrict competition.25 It was, and still is, important for courts to promote the
public welfare by refusing to enforce contracts that conflict with society’s
moral principles while protecting the freedom to contract. Therefore, courts
are often presented with public interest arguments when determining the
validity of contracts and generally hold that for a contract to be void as
against public policy, its enforcement must be violative of the public good.26
Public policy as a means to invalidate conditional exculpatory contracts
protects the public from the harms of overly broad, confounding, and
complex waivers. In doing so, courts determine whether the language of the
contract is inconspicuous and therefore contrary to public policy. An
important consideration is whether the participant has been put on notice as
to what is contained in the terms of the exculpatory agreement as well as
what is ultimately being waived. Illustrated in Atkins v. Swimwest Family
Fitness Center,27 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin invalidated Swimwest’s
conditional exculpatory contract because Swimwest’s exculpatory language
was vague.28 In Atkins, Swimwest served as a private health and fitness
22

274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002).
24
See Nat’l Bank of Com. v. Greenberg, 258 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tenn. 1953); see also
Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. 1954) (describing the idea of public policy as a
“will-o’-the-wisp of the law [that] varies and changes with the interests, habits, need,
sentiments and fashions of the day”); Hanks v. McDannel, 210 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ky. 1948)
(recognizing the aim of public policy as “the protection and promotion of the public welfare,
including public health and looking to the protection and advancement of morality”).
25
WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 286 (Arthur Corbin ed., 3d
Am. ed. 1919).
26
See, e.g., Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927).
27
691 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 2005).
28
Id. at 343.
23
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facility, equipped with a swimming pool, that was available to the public as
both members and non-members.29 When Dr. Charis Wilson visited this
facility as part of a physical therapy and rehabilitation regimen, she was
required to fill out a guest registration form before being allowed access.30
Swimwest’s guest registration form contained exculpatory language that
shifted all liability to the guest and required but a single signature for both
non-member registration as well as exculpation.31 After filling out the
required paperwork, Wilson was last seen entering the pool by the on-duty
lifeguard.32 In a matter of minutes, Wilson’s body was taken from the bottom
of the pool, and she died one day later.33
In looking for guidance from an earlier Wisconsin case with a similar
issue,34 Atkins adopted a two-pronged approach to determine the validity of
Swimwest’s contract. Unpredictably, the first prong is not a determination
of whether an activity encompasses general categories of risk, but rather
whether the participant likely contemplated a specific risk before assuming
all liability.35 Therefore, the court first looked to whether Swimwest
“clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform[ed] the signer of what
[was] being waived.”36 Here, the court reasoned that an ordinary participant
would not have clearly understood that the guest registration form’s
exculpatory language applied to all others’ negligent and intentional acts,37
and held that the breadth of the waiver made it problematic to determine what
was within Wilson’s contemplation at the time she registered.38
29

Id. at 336.
Id.
31
Id. at 337 (“Waiver Release Statement[:] I agree to assume all liability for myself
without regard to fault, while at Swimwest Family Center. I further agree to hold harmless
Swimwest Fitness Center, or any of its employees for any conditions or injury that may result
to myself while at the Swimwest Fitness Center. I have read the foregoing and understand its
contents.”).
32
See id.
33
See Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 691 N.W. 2d 334, 337 (Wis. 2005). The
attendant coroner listed drowning as the cause of death. Id.
34
Yauger v. Skiing Enters., 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996) (dealing with the wrongful death
of a minor at the Hidden Valley Ski Resort and the enforceability of the corresponding
exculpatory agreement required by that resort).
35
See Atkins, 691 N.W.2d at 341 (noting that Wilson most likely would not have
contemplated “drowning in a four-foot deep pool with a lifeguard on duty”).
36
Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
37
See id. at 340 (justifying this determination because Swimwest’s use of the word
“fault” is all-encompassing and potentially barred any non-member’s claims arising under
any scenario); see also Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 661 (Wis. 1991) (“Only if it is
apparent that the parties, in light of all the circumstances, knowingly agreed to excuse the
defendants from liability will the contract be enforceable.”); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric.
Soc’y, 330 N.W.2d 773, 777–78 (Wis. 1983) (holding that if an exculpatory contract fails to
express the intent of the parties “with particularity[,]” such a contract will not be enforced).
38
See Atkins, 691 N.W.2d at 341.
30
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The second prong asks whether the contract “alert[ed] the signer to the
nature and significance of what is being signed.”39 Again, the court held that
it would be unclear to an ordinary participant whether Swimwest’s form was
a guest registration, an exculpatory contract, or a hybrid of both.40 Holding
the contract unenforceable, Atkins reasoned that Swimwest could have
required non-members to sign an exculpatory contract separate and apart
from the registration form, which would have clearly identified these two
documents and provided Wilson with adequate notice of the exculpation,
guarding against her inadvertent assent to its terms.41 Ultimately, the court
reasoned that the exculpatory language appeared to be a part of the larger
guest registration and that Wilson could not have reasonably agreed to
Swimwest’s exculpation.42
B. A Patchwork of Public Policy: Individualized Jurisdictional
Justifications
In New York, statutes have been enacted for the protection of the public
from unfair exculpation under the belief that contracts that eliminate liability
altogether are per se invalid.43 Section 5-326 of New York’s General
Obligations Law holds that exculpatory contracts that seek to exempt
“pool[s], gymnasium[s], place[s] of amusement or recreation, or similar
establishment[s]” from liability for negligence are void as against public
policy and wholly unenforceable.44 As a result, New York courts broadly
apply this law to invalidate exculpation in several different categories of
extracurricular and recreational activities.45
Connecticut also has a unique way of invalidating exculpatory contracts
that purport to waive liability from public voluntary participation in various
activities. Justifying invalidation on public policy principles, Connecticut
protects the public interest in voluntarily participating in various
nonessential activities as well.46 For example, Hanks v. Powder Ridge
39

Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 63 (emphasis added).
See Atkins, 691 N.W.2d at 336.
41
See id. at 341.
42
See id. at 343.
43
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-326 (2018).
44
Id.
45
See Williams v. City of Albany, 706 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (flag
football); Petrie v. Bridgehampton Rd. Races Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(dirt bike racing); Rogowicki v. Troser Mgmt., 623 N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(skiing); Brancati v. Bar-U-Farm, Inc., 583 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (horseback
riding); Miranda v. Hampton Auto Raceway, Inc., 515 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(automobile racing); Wurzer v. Seneca Sport Parachute Club, 411 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y App.
Div. 1978) (parachute jumping).
46
See, e.g., Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 849 A.2d 813 (Conn. 2004)
(recognizing the existence of the public interest in promoting the public’s participating in
40
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Restaurant Corporation47 held that, because participation in various
“recreational activities, such as snowtubing, skiing, basketball, soccer,
football, racquetball, karate, ice skating, swimming, volleyball[,] or yoga”
constitutes an “important and healthy part of everyday life” of a vast majority
of the population, the conditional requirement of exculpation results in a
violation of public policy, and therefore such contracts are void and
unenforceable.48 Overall, these jurisdictions rely, in a unique manner, on
public policy as a means to protect individuals from inappropriate, overly
broad, or inconspicuous exculpatory contracts.
C. Public Policy and the Parameters of the Public Interest in
Education
Individual state constitutions require its respective governing body to
provide an education for its youth,49 thereby establishing the existence of an
“overwhelming public interest in education.”50 It is no surprise, therefore,
that courts note the importance that schools play in the upbringing of
children.51 While there is an indisputably clear and present public interest in
education, the question remains whether that interest extends beyond the
curriculum. As a result, there are different boundaries as to how far the
public interest in education extends.
It is widely recognized that youth participation in extracurricular
athletics improves students’ physical skills and abilities, and supplements
their curricular development, education, socialization, and contentment.52
Further, the lessons that coaches foster contribute to student athletes’
persistence beyond the athletic field and, thus, positively correlate to their
chances for success after graduation.53 Participation in extracurricular
skiing); Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 337–38 (Conn. 1997) (recognizing the existence
of the public interest in promoting the public’s participation in recreational athletics).
47
885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005).
48
Id. at 746.
49
E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all
the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.”).
50
Clifton v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 11-03640, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61569, at *29
(N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Dorsett v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. and Univs., 940 F.2d 121,
125 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a public interest in education); Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d
426, 432 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
51
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535–36 (1925) (allowing parents to
pursue private or public school options for their children and suggesting that there is no
institution that is a more intimate part of our traditional life than schools).
52
See, e.g., The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS,
https://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-school-activities/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
53
See, e.g., Mike Krings, Study Shows High School Athletes Perform Better in School,
Persist to Graduation More than Non-Athletes, UNIV. KAN. TODAY (Jan. 24, 2014),
https://news.ku.edu/2014/01/15/study-shows-high-school-athletes-performed-better-school-
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athletics also encourages the retention of students who would otherwise drop
out of school but for their proclivity and enthusiasm for athletics.54
Therefore, student involvement in extracurricular activities positively
impacts their education, and participation should continue to be encouraged.
But are these desirable results enough to justify an extension of the public
interest outside of the classroom and onto the field?
There are few differences between the many benefits student athletes
receive and the benefits conveyed by compelled physical education
programs.55 While both programs strive for students to develop the
fundamental knowledge and skills necessary to continue a lifetime of healthy
activity, physical education is first introduced into the curriculum during
elementary school while the opportunity to participate in extracurricular
athletics tends to be present only in high school.56 Unlike physical education,
high school students are not required to participate in extracurricular
athletics but rather can make the decision to attend and participate in physical
persisted-graduation-more-nonApr.
54
See id.
55
Compare Grace Chen, 10 Reasons Why High School Sports Benefit Students, PUB.
SCH. REV., https://www.publicschoolreview.com/blog/10-reasons-why-high-school-sportsbenefit-students (last updated Aug. 28, 2018), and Paige Maslen, The Social and Academic
Benefits
of
Team
Sports,
EDUTOPIA
(Dec.
29,
2015),
https://www.edutopia.org/discussion/social-and-academic-benefits-team-sports, with Admin.
Rules of Mont. 10.58.520 (2015), http://www.mtrules.org/gateway/ruleno.asp?RN=10%2E5
8%2E520 (defining “physical education” as a program requiring the “demonstrate[ion of]
competent motor skill performance in a variety of physical activities[,] . . . strategies to help
students demonstrate responsible personal and social behaviors including mutual respect,
support of others, safety, and cooperation that promote[s] positive relationships and a
productive learning environment[,] . . . [and the] demonstrate[ion of] knowledge and use of
instructional strategies to enhance communication among students in physical activity
settings”); AL DEP’T OF EDUC., ALABAMA COURSE OF STUDY: PHYSICAL EDUCATION 2 (2009)
https://web.alsde.edu/general/HPE_2009_AL_Course_of_Study_Physical_Education.pdf
(recognizing skill development, cognitive development, social development, and physical
activity and health as the “fundamental components necessary for achieving the goal of
excellence in physical education.”); GA DEP’T OF EDUC., GEORGIA PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FOR PHYSICAL EDUCATION 5 (2008), https://www.georgiastandards.org/standards/GPS%20Su
pport%20Docs/Physical_Education_Standards_4-30-09.pdf (outlining the components to
“quality physical education[,]” including “skill development . . . regular, healthful physical
activity . . . [and] improved physical fitness”).
56
See COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., COLORADO ACADEMIC STANDARDS: COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH & PHYSICAL EDUCATION (2009), https://www.cde.state.co.us/sites/default/files/docu
ments/cohealthpe/documents/health_pe_standards_adopted_12.10.09.pdf; See LYNN J.
HOUSE ET AL., MISS. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2013–2014 MISSISSIPPI PHYSICAL EDUCATION
FRAMEWORK 4 (2013), https://www.mdek12.org/sites/default/files/Offices/MDE/Home_Page
/mississippi-physical-education-framework.pdf; The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L
FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, https://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-schoolactivities/ (last visited May 15, 2019); 2013–2014 MISSISSIPPI PHYSICAL EDUCATION
FRAMEWORK 4 (2013), https://www.mdek12.org/sites/default/files/Offices/MDE/Home_Page
/mississippi-physical-education-framework.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
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education in order to fulfill curricular requirements.57 This differentiating
characteristic has caused some jurisdictions to limit the extension of public
policy considerations when determining the enforceability and validity of
conditional exculpatory contracts in extracurricular activities.
III. THE REACH OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EDUCATION
When determining whether the public interest is affected by the
enforcement of conditional exculpatory contracts, courts have not yet
universally adopted a clear-cut test. As a result, courts either formulate their
own methods through a dissection of pre-existing approaches or cherry-pick
certain factors for consideration, resulting in a patchwork of individualized
enforcement.58 The first court to lay out an analytical scheme was the
Supreme Court of California in Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California.59 Since Tunkl, various jurisdictions have adopted what are
known as the Tunkl factors when determining the outer limits of public
interest.60
Other jurisdictions refuse to invalidate conditional exculpatory
contracts in the context of recreational activities under public policy
considerations.61 In Maryland, Wolf v. Ford62 expressly rejected complete
reliance on the Tunkl factors.63 Instead, that court concluded that the ultimate
determination of what constitutes the public interest can be made only after
a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” against the backdrop of
society’s expectations.64 While jurisdictions rely on the general rule that
“[e]xculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate
57
See Eileen O’Brien & Mary Rollefson, Extracurricular Participation and Student
Engagement, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (1995), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs95/95741.pdf.
58
See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (introducing a
six-factor inquiry to justify its determination that a conditional exculpatory contract had
adversely affected the public interest); Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1994) (adopting a
unique totality of the circumstances test); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (en
banc) (cherry-picking four factors from other courts that had resolved similar issues).
59
383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
60
See generally Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874 (Del. Super. Ct.
2005); Moore v. Hartley Motors, 36 P.3d 628 (Alaska 2001).
61
See, e.g., Henderson v. Quest Expeditions, Inc., 174 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005), overruled on other grounds by Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehab. Hosp., LP,
565 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2018) (“[M]any jurisdictions have recognized that . . . recreational
sporting activities are not activities of an essential nature which would render exculpatory
clauses contrary to the public interest.”); Seigneur v. Nat’l Fitness Inst., Inc., 752 A.2d 631,
641 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (following the trend that “courts from other jurisdictions
almost universally have held that contracts relating to recreational activities do not fall within
any of the categories that implicate public interest concerns” (citations omitted)).
62
644 A.2d 522 (1994).
63
See id. at 527.
64
Id.
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the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy,”65 the
determination of whether the public interest is present and affected is the first
and most important step in any judicial analysis.
A. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California66
Although the conditional exculpatory contract in Tunkl did not bar
participation in extracurricular athletics, the court nevertheless laid out a
suggestive rubric to identify the existence of the public interest, and indicated
certain types of transactions in which exculpation would be invalid due to an
encroachment of public policy.67 Rather, Tunkl concerned the validity of a
conditional exculpatory contract imposed upon a patient for admission to the
University of California Los Angeles Medical Center (“UCLA Medical
Center”).68 Before Tunkl was treated, he voluntarily entered into an
agreement that set forth certain conditions for his admission, among which
was exculpation which released the hospital “from any and all liability for
the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees. . . .”69 Tunkl’s
estate sought to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the
alleged negligence of the two attending physicians that ultimately resulted in
his death.70
Admitting that “no definition of the concept of public interest can be
contained within the four corners of a formula,”71 Tunkl devised six separate
categorical considerations that, if any or all exist, may justify the invalidation
of conditional exculpation as against public policy: (1) whether the
underlying bargain concerns an endeavor of a type generally thought suitable
for public regulation; (2) whether the party seeking exculpation performs a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity; (3) whether the party seeking exculpation holds itself out as
willing to perform that specific service for any member of the public; (4)
whether, because of the essential nature of the service(s) offered, the party
seeking exculpation possessed a decisive advantage of bargaining strength
against any members of the public who sought such service; (5) whether,
having exercised superior bargaining power, the party seeking exculpation
confronted the public with a standardized adhesion contract and provided no
provision whereby an interested party had the option to purchase additional
65

Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see
also Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(“[R]ecreational sports do not constitute a public interest under Tunkl.”).
66
383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
67
See generally id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 442.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 444.
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protection against negligence; and (6) whether the party seeking the service
was placed under the control of the exculpated party.72
After the court determined that UCLA Medical Center’s contract
exhibited all of the six factors, it ruled the contract unenforceable and
categorically held that all hospital-patient exculpatory contracts fall within a
general category of conditional agreements which may be unenforceable as
against public policy.73 The Supreme Court of California justified its holding
by recognizing the possibility that potential patients who may enter into
exculpatory contracts with hospitals are not necessarily in a position to reject
the terms of the conditional contract, and, in some cases, are not in a position
to find an alternative treatment facility.74 In all, the court stated that these
contracts result in patients who have placed themselves under the complete
control of the hospital and therefore have become totally subject to the risk
of its carelessness.75 Requiring patients to exculpate the hospital as a
condition for eventual treatment is therefore against public policy.76
B. Wolf v. Ford77
Wolf v. Ford did not turn on the validity of an exculpatory contract
involving extracurricular athletics either, but rather on the conditional
exculpation of a securities investment firm by its client.78 After receiving a
settlement stemming from a lawsuit arising from an automobile accident,
Wolf retained Ford, a stockbroker, with the intent to invest and preserve her
money.79 Wolf executed a contract that contained exculpatory language that
exonerated Ford and his investment firm from “any and all liability for losses
which may occur while [Ford is] acting on [Wolf’s] behalf except for such
as may result from [Ford’s] gross negligence or willful misconduct.”80
Pursuant to the contract, and in the normal course of business, Ford invested
Wolf’s capital in various stock options.81 Upset with the associated returns
of her portfolio, Wolf terminated her account and filed suit in an attempt to
hold Ford accountable for his alleged negligence.82 Despite Wolf’s
72

See generally Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444–46.
See id. at 447 (recognizing that “practical and crucial necessit[ies]” affect the public
interest to the extent that patients may be in critical need of the offered service or skill of the
hospital, whether private or public).
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1993).
78
See generally id.
79
Id. at 524.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
73
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contention that her prior exculpation of Ford was void as against public
policy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s holding
and enforced the contract, limiting Ford’s potential liability to any evidenced
loss sustained by gross negligence or willful misconduct.83
Maryland’s highest court highlighted that the concept of the public
interest is “amorphous” and difficult to apply in order to invalidate
exculpatory contracts.84 Wolf also expressly declined to limit its analysis to
the Tunkl factor test because those six factors have a tendency to become
“too rigid a measuring stick” when determining the existence of the public
interest.85 Although Tunkl warned that its factors were only a “rough
outline” to guide future courts as to whether conditional exculpation affected
the public interest,86 Wolf seemed to take caution and indicated that strict
dependence on the presence or absence of any of the Tunkl factors may be
“arbitrary.”87 Not limiting itself to its six factors, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland declined to engage in a Tunkl analysis and held that the ultimate
determination of the existence of the public interest, and whether or not it is
affected, must be decided after an examination of the “totality of the
circumstances.”88
Because public policy precludes the enforcement of conditional
exculpatory contracts that adversely affect the public interest, Wolf limited
its recognition of the public interest to transactions that involve the
“performance of a public service obligation.”89 Specific to its facts, Wolf
reasoned that the securities industry is inherently risky and willing investors
understand the degree of risk involved in that business.90 Wolf, therefore,
stands for the concept that, unless the allocation of risk between the parties
to a private contract is “patently offensive,” conditional exculpation is
embraced under the freedom to contract in private matters.91

83

Wolf, 644 A.2d at 525.
Id. at 526.
85
Id. at 525–26.
86
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1963).
87
Wolf, 644 A.2d at 527.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 526 (listing such services as “public utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and
public warehousemen”).
90
Id. at 528 (reasoning that “the possibility of poor performance of the securities chosen
is precisely the sort of harm that is within the contemplation of the parties at the time they
entered the agreement”).
91
Id.
84
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IV. THE EXCULPATION OF LIABILITY INHERENT IN EXTRACURRICULAR
ACTIVITIES
Although Tunkl and Wolf did not deal with extracurricular athletics,
three cases have dealt with the more specific issue of the existence of the
public interest and whether it is affected when a school conditions
exculpation on voluntary participation in extracurricular activities.92 In
Wagenblast v. Odessa School District,93 the Supreme Court of Washington
adopted the Tunkl factors to reach its conclusion.94 Looking no further than
those six factors, Wagenblast concluded that conditional exculpation against
future negligence claims in the extracurricular context are invalid based on
a violation of public policy.95 In contrast, the California Court of Appeals
discussed Tunkl and its six factors in Hohe v. San Diego Unified School
District,96 but held that its circumstances presented an “entirely different
situation” because the school did not require exculpation and therefore did
not withhold any service.97 Similarly, in Sharon v. City of Newton,98 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that because participation in
extracurricular athletic programs is neither compelled by the school nor an
essential element of education, the school’s requirement of an exculpatory
contract as a prerequisite to voluntary participation did not offend public
policy and is enforceable.99
A. Wagenblast v. Odessa School District100
In 1988, Washington became the first state to consider the validity of
exculpatory contracts in schools as a prerequisite for participation in
extracurricular athletic programs.101 In this consolidated case, students from
different schools who desired to participate in extracurricular athletics were
required to release their respective schools from any liability resulting from
the ordinary negligence that arose from their voluntary participation.102
Being a case of first impression in that jurisdiction, the court primarily
looked to Tunkl for guidance and adopted its six-factor analysis to rationalize
92

Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Mass. 2002); Hohe v. San Diego
Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist.,
758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988).
93
758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988).
94
See id. at 971–75.
95
Id. at 969–70.
96
274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1990).
97
Id. at 649.
98
769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002).
99
See id. at 745.
100
758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988).
101
See id.
102
Id. at 969.
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its exploration into whether the public interest was present and whether the
contractual requirement adversely affected that interest.103
Wagenblast examined the facts under each of the six Tunkl factors
individually.104 First, because both of the defendant schools had the ability
to delegate authority over extracurricular athletics to the Washington
Interscholastic Activities Association (“WIAA”), and indeed looked to the
WIAA for its regulatory standards, the court held that each conditional
exculpatory contract concerned a type of activity generally thought suitable
for public regulation.105 As to the first Tunkl factor, Wagenblast held that it
had been satisfied because extracurricular athletic programs were a “fit
subject for such regulation.”106
Second, Wagenblast reasoned that extracurricular athletic programs are
“part and parcel of the overall educational scheme in Washington” and held
that such programs are a matter of great importance to the public.107 The
court justified this conclusion by the total expenditure of time, effort, and
money that Washington schools spent to maintain and progress
extracurricular athletic programs.108 Further, the court detailed the
“substantive” importance of extracurricular athletics to the community in
that they “represent a significant tie of the public at large to [the educational
system].”109 As a result of this enthusiasm, Wagenblast recognized that it
would be unrealistic to view extracurricular athletics as an activity entirely
separate and apart from the required curriculum. In satisfying the second
factor, the Wagenblast court made it clear that offering students the
opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities is a great and important
service to the public.110
Third, the court indicated that the schools held themselves out as
willing to perform this important public service in satisfaction of the next
factor.111 Wagenblast justified this determination based on its understanding
that extracurricular athletics are available to all students who satisfy internal
eligibility standards such as maintaining academic and disciplinary good
standing and having the requisite athletic skill necessary to participate at a
competitive level.112

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 971–72.
See generally id.
See id. at 972.
Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See generally id.
See id. at 973.
See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.
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Fourth, the court held that both of the schools obtained “near-monopoly
power” over extracurricular athletics due to its finding that there are few or
no alternative athletic programs that possess the same attractions inherent in
extracurricular sports.113 Similar to its justification for the second factor, the
court held that the fourth factor was also satisfied, recognizing that athletics
have grown to become of “considerable importance to students and the
general public alike,”114 and as a result, both schools possessed distinct
bargaining strength in requiring the participating student to enter into the
exculpatory agreement.115
Fifth, the court pointed out that the schools had rejected attempts by the
student athletes to modify the terms of the conditional exculpatory
agreements.116 In so finding, the court held that each school exercised
superior bargaining power by offering its students an adhesion contract.117
As a result of the procedures put in place, no student athlete was allowed to
voluntarily participate in any extracurricular athletic activity without first
releasing the school of liability by signing the contract on a take-it-or-leaveit basis.118 Having admitted to an “unwavering policy” concerning the
language and terms of the schools’ conditional exculpation, Wagenblast had
little difficulty justifying the satisfaction of the fifth Tunkl factor.119
Lastly, Wagenblast held that the student athletes were placed under the
control of their schools, and as a result, were subjected to the school’s
carelessness.120 Recognizing that schools owe a duty of care to students to
anticipate foreseeable dangers and take reasonable precautions to protect
them while under their control, the court reasoned that the schools subjected
the students to certain foreseeable risks that resulted in a breach of that duty
of care.121
After a short analysis of the six Tunkl factors, Wagenblast held that both
exculpatory contracts exhibited all six factors.122 Therefore, because the
court found that the public interest was present and adversely affected, the
two exculpatory contracts were ruled unenforceable.123

113
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Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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B. Hohe v. San Diego Unified School District124
Two years after Washington’s decision in Wagenblast, California was
tasked with a similar determination of whether public policy had been
violated when a school conditioned student participation in an
extracurricular activity on its exculpation.125 Hohe, a fifteen-year-old high
school student, was required to enter into two separate exculpatory contracts
in order to attend a hypnotism show sponsored by her school.126 After she
was selected from a group of student volunteers, Hohe was hypnotized and
sustained multiple injuries after sliding from her chair onto the ground
throughout the demonstration.127
The court ultimately rejected Hohe’s argument that the exculpatory
contracts required by her school violated public policy.128 Looking to Tunkl,
the court stated that the facts of the case presented an entirely different
situation because, unlike Tunkl, the public interest was absent and therefore
could not be implicated.129 Citing to the six Tunkl factors, Hohe reinforces
that “[n]o public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one
party . . . agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have
placed upon the other party.”130
After considering the language and scope of the two conditional
exculpatory contracts at issue, the court indicated that invalidation would cut
against public policy and highlighted the school’s apprehension and
cautionary steps, which resulted in the various procedures put in place to
protect Hohe and limit its own exposure to liability.131 Unlike the view
expressed in Wagenblast, the Hohe court believed that the entire community
benefits from the policies that require exculpation because such waivers
enable schools to operate without the fear and omnipresent threat of
overwhelming litigation costs.132 The court concluded that because Hohe
and her father agreed to shoulder the risks of injury in two separate
exculpatory agreements, public policy did not bar the transfer of liability and
held each of the school’s exculpatory contracts enforceable.133
124

274 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
See id. at 648.
126
See id.
127
See id.
128
See id. at 649.
129
See id.
130
Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649 (citing Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,
446 (Cal. 1963)).
131
See id. (“The public as a whole receives the benefit of such waivers so that groups
such as Boy and Girl Scouts, Little League, and parent-teacher associations are able to
continue.”).
132
Id. (“Every learning experience involves risk.”).
133
See id.
125
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C. Sharon v. City of Newton134
More recently, Massachusetts faced the same issue.135 In Sharon,
Newton North High School conditioned Sharon’s participation in the
cheerleading team on its exculpation from liability.136 After she fell and
fractured her arm during practice, Sharon brought suit to recoup the
associated medical expenses, arguing that her school was nevertheless liable
because the conditional exculpatory contract violated public policy and was
unenforceable.137
Similar to Hohe, Sharon considered policies that favored the
enforcement of exculpatory contracts as well as the community’s
encouragement surrounding extracurricular athletic programs.138 The court
noted that shifting the foreseeable risk of negligently caused injury onto a
student athlete as a condition of participation in a potentially dangerous
activity “ordinarily contravenes no public policy” and that the enforcement
of such exculpation was consistent with Massachusetts law.139
In line with Tunkl, and having further considered the facts of the case
against the backdrop of societal expectations, Sharon pointed out that the
school’s exculpatory contract provided Sharon with the option to purchase
supplemental accident insurance.140 The court also noted that the school’s
exculpatory contract was “clearly labeled” and filled out by Sharon with the
distinct purpose of ensuring her participation as a member of the Newton
High School cheerleading team.141 Looking to whether the school possessed
a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against interested student
athletes,142 the court nevertheless reasoned that so conditioning a student
athlete’s voluntary participation in a non-essential, extracurricular activity is
enforceable.143 Through its analysis, Sharon ultimately adopted a totality of
the circumstances approach and held that the public interest was not offended
by the school’s requirement that an exculpatory contract be a prerequisite to

134

769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002).
See id. at 744.
136
Id. at 741.
137
Id. at 741–42.
138
Id. at 744.
139
Id. at 745.
140
See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 743 (indicating that the plaintiff explicitly declined to
purchase the insurance); see also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal.
1963) (referencing Tunkl factor five).
141
Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 743.
142
See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (“As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the
economic setting of the transaction, the [school district] possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength against [the student] who seeks [its] services.”).
143
See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 744; see also Minassian v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 509
N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. 1987).
135
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voluntary participation its cheerleading team.144
V. A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY
It is the prerogative of the states to decide whether the public interest is
present when students voluntarily participate in extracurricular activities. As
a result, there may never be uniformity on that front. Washington’s
individual analysis of the six Tunkl factors set forth in Wagenblast provides
a short but persuasive stage for other courts.145 Wagenblast’s limited
analysis, however, too narrowly focused its examination of the facts as they
fit into the six Tunkl factors instead of considering other circumstances
outside of the Tunkl universe. Until there is consistency in the way courts
determine the existence of the public interest, and whether or not that interest
is affected, two competing views will persist. It is my position that a third
method—a hybrid of Tunkl’s six-factor approach and Sharon’s totality of the
circumstances analysis—could resolve this issue and preserve the popularity
and availability of extracurricular athletic programs while protecting
schools’ interests.
A. Washington’s Analysis in Wagenblast
In all, Tunkl’s six-factor analysis steers courts in the right direction
when deciding whether a public interest is present and affected. Parts of
Washington’s analysis, however, are flawed. Wagenblast’s inquiry of
factors one,146 three,147 and six148 is sound. Consideration of the legislative
enactments which granted each of the schools “the authority to control,
supervise, and regulate the conduct of interscholastic athletics,”149 made it
clear that all extracurricular athletic programs were a fit subject for public
regulation in satisfaction of the first factor. Similarly, there was no argument
against fulfillment of the third factor because schools generally hold
themselves out as willing to provide and perform the services associated with
extracurricular athletic programs.150 Unlike privatized athletic programs

144

See Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 745.
See generally Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1998).
146
See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (determining whether the exculpatory contract “concerns a
business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation”).
147
See id. (determining whether the school district “holds [itself] out as willing to perform
this service for any [student] who seeks it, or at least for any [student] coming within certain
established standards”).
148
See id. at 446 (determining whether “as a result of the transaction, the person or
property of the [student athlete] is placed under the control of the [school district], subject to
the risk of carelessness by the [school district] of [its] agents”).
149
Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972.
150
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
145
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which have an ability to be more selective,151 the extracurricular activities
offered by schools are made available to all students, regardless of wealth,
who are able to satisfy certain skill and eligibility requirements. Lastly, and
in line with the inherent nature of extracurricular athletics, Wagenblast
recognized that because student athletes are placed under the control of their
schools, they are therefore subject to the risks of carelessness.152 The court’s
determination—that a naturally occurring incident of any sports program is
that the student athlete is placed under a substantial amount of his or her
coach’s control153—is undeniable.
Wagenblast’s analysis of the second factor,154 however, paved the way
for the unnecessary invalidation of each of the schools’ conditional
exculpatory contracts. Had Washington extended its analysis beyond the
rough outline provided by Tunkl, the court would have understood that, while
schools undoubtedly perform a popular service by offering students the
opportunity to voluntarily participate in extracurricular athletics, the
importance of these extracurricular programs cannot be on equal footing
with a traditional educational curriculum. It would have followed that the
limited public interest in education on which the court justified its holding
would not have extended outside of the classroom.155 Further, because
extracurricular athletics, by definition, are non-essential to a student’s
education, Wagenblast could have found that, by conditioning participation
upon exculpation, the schools did not withhold any advantages from nonparticipating students because the same themes and benefits of
extracurricular athletics are conveyed through the required curricular
physical education programs. It would follow that even if the public interest
in education is present within the context of extracurricular athletics, it is not
strong enough to invalidate conditional exculpatory contracts rooted in
public policy.
1. The Public Interest in Education Does Not Extend Beyond
the Curriculum
Under Wagenblast, Washington’s consideration of the second Tunkl
factor consisted of an inquiry into whether such schools engaged in the
performance of a service of great importance to the public.156 While there is
no fundamental right for a student to participate in extracurricular
151

Sean Gregory, How Kids’ Sports Became a $15 Billion Industry, TIME (Aug. 24, 2017),
http://time.com/4913687/how-kids-sports-became-15-billion-industry/.
152
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
153
See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.
154
See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (determining whether the party seeking exculpation “is
engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public”).
155
Contra Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972.
156
See id.
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programs,157 it is undeniable that such activities nevertheless have
educational value.158 Student athletes learn lessons through practice and
competition that contribute and supplement the aims and focus of their
curricula. As a result of the total expenditure of time and effort by both
schools and student athletes alike, Wagenblast held that extracurricular
athletics are “part and parcel” of a school’s educational scheme and found
no difference between the classes taught inside of classrooms and the lessons
learned on the fields in which the students were injured.159
This conclusion is misguided. While extracurricular athletic programs
are undoubtedly attractive to students and positively correlate with retention
and graduation statistics, research shows that the intensive and excessive
training inherent in extracurricular athletics can serve as an obstacle for
academic advancement.160 Further, differentiating characteristics between
required curricular courses and voluntary extracurricular activities also
provide insight as to why the public interest in education does not extend to
extracurricular activities. For example, both athletic and academic
extracurricular activities are nothing more than a supplement of the formal
knowledge acquired within the classroom.161 Unlike its curricular
counterparts, extracurricular activities are not graded and convey no
academic credit toward the pursuit of graduation. In addition, extracurricular
activities traditionally take place before or after the school day. It was a
stretch for Wagenblast to find no differentiating characteristics between the
curricular and extracurricular schemes of Washington’s schools and hold
that there is a present public interest in extracurricular activities powerful
enough to invalidate the conditional exculpatory contracts at issue in that
case.

157
See generally Commonwealth by Packel v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n., 334
A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); see also Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 890 (Wash.
1975).
158
See Sherwood v. Moxee Sch. Dist. No. 90, 363 P.2d 138, 144 (Wash. 1961) (Hill, J.,
concurring).
159
Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 972.
160
See Practical Considerations on Sport in Education, SPORTANDDEV.ORG,
https://www.sportanddev.org/en/learn-more/education-and-child-and-youthdevelopment/practical-considerations-sport-education-0 (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
161
See, e.g., NYSPHSAA, Inc. Bylaws and Eligibility Standards, N.Y. ST. PUB. HIGH SCH.
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
INC.,
http://www.nysphsaa.org/Portals/0/PDF/Handbook/20142015%20Handbook/ByLaws%20and%20Eligibilty%20Standards%202014-2015%20Handb
ook%209-13-14-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Eligibility Rules, PA. INTERSCHOLASTIC
ATHLETIC ASS’N, INC., https://www.piaa.org/schools/eligibility/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
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2. Extracurricular Activities do not Enjoy the Benefit of the
Public Interest
Washington’s analysis of the fourth Tunkl factor inquired into whether
each school possessed a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against
the students seeking to participate in the extracurricular activities being
offered.162 In the most genuine way, extracurricular athletics strengthen and
unite the public through athletics because players and fans represent their
communities in solidarity. Similar to collegiate and professional sports,
community enthusiasm is what drives many extracurricular athletic
programs and has established some of the longest rivalries in the United
States.163 Even so, extracurricular athletics do not rise to affect the public
interest in education because they are nonessential.164 Wagenblast notes that
schools have a “near-monopoly power” on athletic programs and that, in
most instances, no alternative program of organized competition exists.165
That is simply not the case.
Generally, physical education is a requirement for all schools in the
United States.166 Similar to extracurricular athletics, physical education
allows students to engage in the daily recommended amount of physical
activity, and enables them to interact in a way that regular classrooms
cannot.167 For example, physical literacy—a concept on which the national
physical education standards are based—promotes the development of
competence and confidence in a wide variety of physical activities.168
Students would be at a great disadvantage if schools did not provide a
requisite physical education that conveyed aptitude with respect to motor
skills, movement patterns, and other personal and social behaviors. While
many students cannot afford private athletic programs where exculpatory
releases may not be required,169 schools are nevertheless able to convey the
162

Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.
See Sarajane Cedrone & Geoff Serra, The Nation’s Oldest High-School Football
Rivalry, CONN. EXPLORED (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.ctexplored.org/the-nations-oldesthigh-school-football-rivalry/.
164
Extracurricular, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (Frederick C. Mish
et al. eds., Miriam-Webster, Inc. 11th ed. 2003).
165
Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.
166
Carrie
Soucy,
States
that
Require
Physical
Education,
https://study.com/academy/popular/states-that-require-physical-education.html (last visited
Apr. 2019).
167
Grant Shoffstall, Why Do Student Athletes Have to Take Gym Class?, DAILY AM. (Jan.
27, 2016), https://www.dailyamerican.com/entertainment/highschoolhighlights/why-dostudent-athletes-have-to-take-gym-class/article_db445a95-bbe4-588b-9ebc3dcc6ca15134.html.
168
See National PE Standards, SHAPE AMERICA—SOCIETY OF HEALTH AND PHYSICAL
EDUCATORS, https://www.shapeamerica.org/standards/pe/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
169
Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973.
163
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same educational benefits to students who opt not to participate in
extracurricular athletics as a result of requiring physical education in their
curricula.
B. The Relationship Between Extracurricular Athletics and the
Public Interest
Cautioned by Wolf v. Ford,170 Wagenblast adopted the Tunkl factors but
did not heed Maryland’s suggestion that those six considerations should not
be dispositive, but rather used as a “rough outline” to guide the court’s
determination of which exculpatory provisions could be found
unenforceable.171 Ultimately, Wagenblast failed to conduct any other type
of analysis or consider other factors outside of Tunkl,172 and its holding is
based on this deficiency.
Thankfully, a more thorough analysis was conducted by the court in
Sharon where Massachusetts did not limit its examination, but instead
looked to other relevant considerations in conjunction with a Tunkl
analysis.173 In doing so, Sharon noted that it also considered the important
policies of the state when analyzing public policy arguments.174 Through a
unique approach, Sharon considered the Commonwealth’s longstanding
tradition of favoring enforcement of exculpatory contracts.175 Here, the court
recognized that “[a] party may, by agreement, allocate risk and exempt itself
from liability that it might subsequently incur as a result of its own
negligence.”176 Sharon also looked to Cormier v. Central Massachusetts
Chapter of the National Safety Council,177 which stands for the proposition
that placing the risk of a negligently caused injury on the injured participant
“as a condition of that person’s voluntary choice to engage in a potentially
dangerous activity” usually does not infringe upon the public policy of
Massachusetts.178
Another distinctive consideration was Sharon’s reflection upon the
Commonwealth’s encouragement of the availability of youth-based
extracurricular athletic programs. The court noted that such encouragement
is embodied in legislation which exempts providers from liability for
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negligence.179 Finally, while considering Sharon’s argument that if the
exculpatory contract were enforced, there would be no mechanism in place
to prevent Massachusetts from requiring exculpation for simply allowing a
child to attend school, the court indicated that extracurricular athletics are
“neither compelled nor essential,” and that “such a comparison does not
necessarily follow.”180
My position is that Sharon stands for the correct view that the public
interest, in no way, is affected by the regulation of extracurricular athletics
on the condition that liability be shifted from the school to the student athlete.
Wagenblast would have come to a different conclusion had the court
ventured beyond the boundaries of the suggestive factors laid out in Tunkl
because the public interest, if any, associated with extracurricular athletics is
not comparable to the public interest in education. Instead, Wagenblast
disposed of this discussion in one short paragraph,181 reflecting the lack of
legal justification for its most important finding.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unless the party seeking exculpation is performing a public service
obligation182 or an essential service,183 it is difficult to determine whether the
public interest is present and would be adversely affected through the
introduction of a conditional exculpatory contract.184 Just as electricity, heat,
and hot water qualify as a service of practical necessity to the public, and
therefore are worthy of protection by the public interest, so too does
education.185 It does not automatically follow, however, that the public
interest in education extends to extracurricular athletics. “[M]erely
possessing inherent allure” does not elevate extracurricular activities into the
necessary categories of a public school education itself.186
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